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Abstract
I address four topics: how our capacities to monitor poverty in Europe have improved
substantially over recent decades; how progress on EU poverty reduction has been dis-
appointing and why this has been; conceptual and measurement issues; and the future
direction of EU-level anti-poverty actions. I follow in the footsteps of a giant—my
perspectives are essentially elaborations of points made by Tony Atkinson.
Keywords Poverty · Material deprivation · Europe · EU-SILC
JEL Classification C81 · D31 · I32
1 Introduction
This paper provides a number of perspectives on poverty in Europe, drawing heavily on
the work of Tony Atkinson. The paper’s title refers to Europe rather than a set of specific
countries. The distinction is important: the discourse on poverty within European
countries has taken an increasingly Europe-level dimension as the integration process
has deepened. This is reflected in the ways in which poverty is now conceptualised,
measured, and monitored. The goal of this paper is to illustrate these developments,
referring to the historical experience, while also providing empirical evidence about
poverty trends using several indicators, together with remarks about the direction of
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anti-poverty policy in an era of austerity and greater questioning of the roles of EU-
level versus national institutions and initiatives.
In the course of the paper, I pay homage to Tony Atkinson, a true European and
internationalist who was dedicated to reducing poverty everywhere. Tony contributed
definitive studies of income distribution, poverty and social inclusion in Europe over
several decades, as I shall first briefly explain. For extensive overviews of Tony’s work,
including many other topics, see inter alia Aaberge et al. (2017) and Jenkins (2017).
Consider, for example, Tony’s 1992 study with John Micklewright of the distri-
bution of income in Eastern Europe before the Iron Curtain disappeared. This is
distinguished by its originality (few had examined this topic before) and by its care-
ful assemblage of data from a range of sources. Alongside material about earnings
inequality are chapters on the distribution of household income, issues of measure-
ment, and discussion of poverty and the safety net. Poverty in Europe (1998), based on
Tony’s 1990 Yrjö Jahnsson Lectures, is an extensive review of how to measure poverty
in Europe and assess differences across years and countries, the economics of poverty,
and the political economy of anti-poverty policy in Europe. His 2002 and 2007 books,
joint with Bea Cantillon, Eric Marlier, and Brian Nolan, on Social Indicators and The
EU and Social Inclusion are landmark studies in the theory and practice of social indi-
cators. This research forms the basis of the extensive set of indicators used by the EU
for more than a decade to monitor social inclusion and now institutionalised in their
Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC), the source for most of the
estimates presented later in this paper. Tony and colleagues’ work develops a clear set
of principles related to measurement validity and data quality, also acknowledging the
practical needs of policy-makers and citizens for transparent and timely information.
The team’s work did not stop with their initial analysis (2002) but also considered at
length implementation challenges and how to take the EU social inclusion process fur-
ther forward (the 2007 volume). This continued with the Net-SILC projects that Tony
led with Eric Marlier. Their 2010 and 2017 edited volumes (the latter co-edited with
Ann-Catherine Guio) are extensive collections considering the strengths and weak-
nesses of EU-SILC, as well as the potential for modifications and extensions to it.
Tony’s 2010 Macerata Lecture, although an unpublished working paper, stands out as
a valuable review of the progress being made to reduce poverty and increase social
inclusion in Europe, written at the time the EU-2020 indicators were being decided
upon. Finally, I refer to Tony’s 2017 report for the World Bank and his last book
(2019). Monitoring Global Poverty brings to a world stage many of the issues Tony
had considered in the European context, including going beyond defining poverty only
in monetary terms to include additional indicators, the relationships between globally
harmonized and national estimates, and careful attention to data requirements and to
data quality. Measuring Poverty Around the World continues these themes but does so
in broader fashion. Rich countries, including those in Europe, are integrated into the
conceptual discussion alongside middle- and low-income countries. The recommen-
dation of Tony’s 2017 report to derive genuinely global poverty estimates (rather than
the previous practice of having estimates covering middle- and low-income countries
only) is taken up again and illustrated in his 2019 book. The World Bank is now
implementing the recommendation.
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There are four enduring themes in all of Tony’s work that are also reflected in
his work on poverty in Europe. First, Tony always believed that the topic of income
distribution is an integral part of economics. Thus policy about poverty cannot and
should not be seen separately from economic policy. For example, he has written
that ‘[o]ne important argument in favour of a poverty target is that it would place
anti-poverty policy on the same footing as macro-economic policy’ (1998: 151), and:
We cannot consider anti-poverty policy in isolation from other policies. The
scope for financing income maintenance depends on macro-economic policy
choices, on levels of government spending, and on rates of inflation. The use
of transfer payments or other instruments of anti-poverty policy … in turn have
implications for economic policy. Social and economic policy are interdepen-
dent. This may appear obvious, but it remains the case that social policy is often
placed in a separate compartment. (Atkinson 1998: 151.)
Second, Tony emphasised the importance of EU-level institutions and actions for
making progress against poverty in each Member State. The EU context provided lead-
ership, ‘contextualised benchmarking’ and mutual learning across countries. Third,
Tony believed strongly in the importance of thinking clearly about measurement prin-
ciples but not in isolation—how these relate to policy formulation and monitoring are
key and integral issues as well. And that leads to the fourth theme: that it is essential
for poverty analysis and poverty to get the statistical infrastructure right, including
data.
Tony also brought two distinctive personal traits to all his work on poverty analysis
and poverty. He was an internationalist. Alongside his deep concern and knowledge
of the British situation, he was a Europhile, very knowledgeable about Europe and he
served various European organisations (for example he was a member of the Conseil
d’Analyse Economique advising the French Prime Minister 1997–2001, and of the
European Statistical Governance Advisory Board 2009–2011). Global perspectives
have always been there too, not only in his final publications. It was in 1998, not 2017,
that Tony wrote: ‘as we think about developments in Europe, we should not lose sight of
the objective of eliminating world poverty, which in my view has precedence’ (1998:
152). Tony’s second trait is his progressive and optimistic mind-set when thinking
about anti-poverty policy at times when it appears that little progress is being made.
In what follows I elaborate on the Atkinsonian themes that I have drawn attention
so far, very much following in the footsteps of a giant. I address four topics. Section 2
shows how our capacities to monitor in Europe have improved substantially over
recent decades. Section 3 illustrates how progress on EU poverty reduction has been
disappointing and reviews analysis by Tony and others considering the reasons for
this. In Sect. 4, I discuss some conceptual and measurement issues with empirical
illustrations relating to how we should measure ‘poverty’ and specify policy targets.
In the final section, I consider the future direction of EU-level anti-poverty actions in
the light of the earlier discussion, ending by contrasting Tony’s optimistic approach
with the pessimistic perspectives which are perhaps more prevalent.
123
S. P. Jenkins
2 Improvements in Monitoring Capacity and Knowledge
Designing anti-poverty policies without having an accompanying statistical infrastruc-
ture to monitor progress is like building a house on sand rather than rock. Statistical
monitoring is an essential part of a poverty and social inclusion policy agenda. As Tony
and colleagues have emphasised in the European context, ‘[w]e need to be particularly
concerned about the three-way linkage between policy, vulnerable groups, and indi-
cators’ (Marlier et al. 2007: 239). Only then can we determine what the problems are,
who is afflicted, and how social policies affect the problems. Frank Vandenbroucke,
a Minster in the Belgian Federal Government intimately engaged with the substantial
increase in statistical monitoring initiatives under the Belgian presidency of the EU in
the 2000s (and a research student of Tony’s) stresses a similar point:
‘[s]ocial indicators are not … a miracle cure for the social problems of the EU,
but they constitute a key instrument for defining and monitoring policies that are put
in place to deal with these problems (Vandenbroucke 2002: x–xi). Vandenbroucke
is also clear about the role that Europe can play collectively: ‘[t]he purpose of the
establishment of a common set of indicators is not a naming and shaming exercise. …
The peer review process supports … mutual learning’ (Vandenbroucke 2002: viii).
Table 1 summarises the substantial progress made in the statistical monitoring of
poverty and social inclusion in Europe over the last four decades. A reference point for
the situation 40 years ago is provided by Malcolm Sawyer’s (1976) study of income
distribution in OECD countries, with the cross-national comparative statistics based
on compilations from national datasets and, controversially in some cases, leading
to country ‘league table’ positions that differed from national perspectives. Over the
1980s, substantial progress was made in the availability of harmonised cross-nationally
Table 1 Milestones in European statistical monitoring of poverty and social exclusion
Date Initiatives EU data
1980s EC Poverty Programmes; major
Eurostat symposia (1984, 1989)
Compilations of national data sets
1990s First pan-European data: European
Community Household Panel
ECHP, 1994–2001, 14 MS
2000 Lisbon Council: Open Method of
Coordination framework with
National Action Plans
2001 Atkinson et al. report proposing a
common EU-wide set of social
indicators; adopted shortly thereafter
2000s EU ‘Laeken’ indicators (2001),
subsequently refined
Mid-2000s onwards Pan-European output-harmonised
data: EU-Statistics on Living
Conditions
EU-SILC; coverage reflects EU
enlargement
2010 EU2020 targets include a Social
Inclusion objective
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comparable data and hence statistically robust analysis. The Luxembourg Income
Study database was in the vanguard and the leading early study based on it is Atkinson
et al. (1995).
There were also European initiatives at the same time. During the 1980s, the Euro-
pean Commission funded three Poverty Programmes. Although the programmes were
not specifically about statistical infrastructure, there were major symposia in 1984
and 1989 that considered related issues. The 1990s saw the first pan-European data
initiative in the field of income distribution, the European Community Household
Panel (ECHP), with 14 Member States eventually participating (with data covering
1994–2001). A key feature was the use of input harmonisation—the same survey
instrument was fielded in multiple countries.
The next major monitoring milestone was the Lisbon Council of 2000 which
established the Open Method of Coordination (OMC) framework. Within the OMC,
Member States agree upon common objectives for the EU as a whole, and a set of
common indicators to assess national and EU progress towards these goals, accom-
panied by National Action Plans which encapsulate the country-specific measures for
reducing poverty. The issues relating to what those common indicators should be was
discussed at length in a report by Tony and colleagues (subsequently published as
Atkinson et al. 2002). They proposed a hierarchy of primary indicators of poverty and
social inclusion. These leading indicators were to be supported by secondary indica-
tors providing additional detail and covering complementary areas. These were the
basis of the ‘Laeken’ indicators adopted by the EU in 2001 and subsequently refined.
The next major milestone was the introduction of the new pan-European data sets,
the EU-SILC, in the mid-2000s. Notably, for the first time, Member States were man-
dated by law to deliver data to the EU. Compared to the ECHP, these data cover
many more countries—reflecting EU enlargement. The social indicators that have to
be delivered are specified but countries have some discretion about the instruments
they use to collect and produce (though Eurostat provides guidance). In particular,
some countries use administrative data registers to collect data, though the majority
continue to use household surveys. By contrast with the ECHP, there is output rather
than input harmonisation, and so cross-national comparability is harder to achieve.
A dramatic change from the 1990s is that estimates for every EU-SILC indicator are
now made available through Eurostat’s Online Database (n.d.) and, in addition, the unit
record data from which the estimates are derived are much more accessible to academic
and other research users than ECHP data ever were. Registered users can gain access
much more quickly and easily (the application process is appropriately thorough but
much more timely) and the charges are much less prohibitive. (Arguably the difficulties
of accessing ECHP unit record data sowed the seeds of the ECHP’s demise: see Jenkins
1999.) Access provides opportunities for the scrutiny of official statistics, consideration
of alternative definitions, and much other research on related topics including e.g.
developments such as the EUROMOD tax-benefit microsimulation model—in which
Tony Atkinson played a leading advisory role (Atkinson 2009).
The final monitoring milestone is the agreement of the EU2020 targets in 2010.
Alongside four targets referring to employment, R&D/innovation, climate change and
energy, and education, the EU has a fifth target relating to poverty/social exclusion.
On the face of it, this is concrete evidence of social policy being considered alongside
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economic policies. I return to consider the monitoring of this target (and Tony’s views
about it) at the end of this paper.
The substantial improvements in statistical monitoring capacity that have occurred
over the last 25 years are illustrated by a comparison with the situation at the end of
the 1980s. The European Commission asked Michael O’Higgins and me to undertake
a survey of poverty in EU countries (O’Higgins and Jenkins 1990). Our brief was
to replicate an earlier Commission study providing poverty estimates for 1975 and
to extend it to 1980 and 1985, all to be done a short deadline. In common with
the Sawyer (1976) study, O’Higgins and I had to rely on national data sources and
on country correspondents who derived estimates from these following a protocol
regarding definitions and coverage that we provided them. We did the best we could
but there were issues with incomplete cross-national comparability of the data, and we
had coverage of only 12 EU Member States. The data were not always available for
precisely the 3 years we sought, and some data were missing altogether. For example
for Germany in 1985, we had to derive estimates by projection. There was only one
headline indicator—the proportion of persons in income poverty (defined as living in a
household with an equivalized income less than half the contemporary mean). Overall,
we estimated that the proportion of persons in poverty in the 12 countries considered
was around 12.8% in the mid-1970s (1973/1977), was much the same around 1980
(1978/1981), and rose by just over one percentage point, to 13.9% in the mid-1980s
(1984/1985).
According to Tony Atkinson, ‘the European Commission President, Jacques Delors,
publicized the estimates … and their use was instrumental in developing the social
dimension of the EU’ (2019: 2). However, the results were controversial, so much
so that the Commission withdrew our report from circulation without providing an
explanation. (It is now available in electronic form from the website of the Publications
Office of the European Union.)
The monitoring situation improved over time nonetheless. See, for instance, the
comprehensive Eurostat-commissioned research by Hagenaars et al. (1994, 1998)
presenting poverty estimates for years around 1988. Notably, the researchers derived
their estimates for all 12 EU countries from household budget survey unit record data
rather than in a piecemeal fashion as O’Higgins and I had to do. The survey data
themselves remained not widely available however. (Distinctively, as well, household
resources were measured using consumption expenditure rather than income.)
Nowadays the situation is completely different from the 1980s—estimates are easily
accessible and uncontroversial. Information about poverty levels and trends for Mem-
ber States and the EU as a whole is readily available from Eurostat’s Online Database
(n.d.). The wealth of information available about poverty and social inclusion is living
proof of the impact of Atkinson et al. (2002) pioneering work.
With only nine mouse clicks you can map poverty rates across European countries,
with Member States categorised according to values for the headline poverty indicator,
the proportion of persons living in a household with an equivalized disposable income
less than 60% of the national contemporary median income. The latest estimates at
the time of writing refer to 2016. If you make the clicks, you will see that the highest
poverty rates are in Bulgaria, Romania, and Spain, where between one-fifth and one
quarter of the population is poor. The lowest poverty rates are in Finland and Denmark,
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with rates of around 10%. Subject to the caveat that definitions differ a little from those
used by O’Higgins and Jenkins (1990), current poverty rates are the same order as those
we reported. It appears that poverty rates have remained high stubbornly persistent
over the last three decades. The next section considers this lack of progress on poverty
reduction in more detail drawing on estimates that I downloaded from the Eurostat
Online Database (n.d.).
3 Disappointing Progress in Poverty Reduction
The EU’s headline measure of poverty refers to people living in a household with
an equivalized disposable income less than 60% of the contemporary national median
income. This is the ‘at risk of poverty’ (AROP) rate in Eurostat’s terminology. Splicing
together series of estimates from the ECHP through to 2004 and from EU-SILC
thereafter, and using this headline, one derives a picture of trends from around 1995
through to 2016 for EU15 Member States, as well as shorter series for the 10 new
Member States (NMS10) who only joined the enlarged EU in the 2000s. These series
are shown in Figs. 1a, 2a. In the other two panels of each figure are series summarizing
poverty trends using different definitions from the headline indicator: (b) ‘anchored’
poverty rates (referring to people living in a household with an equivalized disposable
income less than 60% of the 2005 contemporary national median income), and (c)
rates of severe multiple deprivation (the SMD rate is defined later on). Presenting the
three series together is intended to facilitate comparisons of similarities in trends over
time as the poverty indicator definition is varied. Trends in the AROP rate are the focus
of this section; the other two series are discussed in the next section.
Within every panel of Figs. 1 and 2, countries are sorted according to their poverty
rate in 2016. The year labels refer to the year that data collection was undertaken. For
the two income-based poverty rates, the rates refer to the previous year—when the
incomes were earned—with the exception of the UK and Ireland which have current-
year measures. The SMD rate refers to the situation at the date of data collection. The
dashed vertical lines mark the beginning of EU-SILC, a reminder of the change in
data source and hence potential discontinuity. (There are a few discontinuities in the
EU-SILC too, for example, for Spain and France between 2007 and 2008.) The solid
vertical line at 2008 marks the onset of the global financial crisis, otherwise known as
the Great Recession.
Among EU15 nations, the headline AROP indicator did not fall over the last two
decades (Fig. 1a). The trend line for most countries is relatively flat, and the range of
the changes over the 20-year period as a whole is around 5 percentage points. For a
majority of countries, the net result is an increase in poverty over the two decades:
although flattish, the lines have a slight upward tilt. The disappointing progress is not
simply a consequence of the Great Recession: the flattish trend line is the general rule
before 2008 in most cases as well as afterwards. And AROP rates do not necessarily
rise in the period directly after 2008; indeed there was a small decline in the UK.
However, there are noticeable deviations from the general patterns. For example,
AROP rates rose in both Finland and Sweden between the mid-1990s and mid-2000s.
AROP rates declined over the mid-2000s in Ireland and also (less noticeably) in Por-
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(a) ‘At risk of poverty’ (AROP) rates: (percentage with income less than 60% of contemporary national median income)
(b) Anchored poverty rates (percentage with income less than 60% of 2005 national median income)
(c) Severe Material Deprivation (SMD) rates (%) 
Notes. Countries are sorted by poverty levels in 2016. The definition of SMD is explained in the text. 
Anchored poverty rates are missing for France. Source: Eurostat Online Database (n.d.)
Fig. 1 Poverty trends, EU15, by measure
tugal. Most strikingly, the AROP rate in Greece rose quickly, by almost 5 percentage
points, between 2008 and 2013.
Among the NMS10 (Fig. 1a), the range in AROP rates is as great as among the
EU15—from around 10% in the Czech Republic to nearer 25% in Bulgaria, Romania,
Latvia and Lithuania, depending on the year—but a more general upward trend in
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(a) ‘At risk of poverty’ (AROP) rates: percentage with income less than 60% of contemporary national median income)
(b) Anchored poverty rates (percentage with income less than 60% of 2005 national median income)
(c) Severe Material Deprivation (SMD) rates (%) 
Notes. Countries are sorted by poverty levels in 2016. The definition of SMD is explained in the text. 
Anchored poverty rates are missing for Bulgaria and Romania. Source: Eurostat Online Database (n.d.)
Fig. 2 Poverty trends, NMS10, by measure
rates is apparent as well as greater year-on-year volatility. It is tempting to attribute
these changes to the substantial changes associated with post-Soviet era transition
but year-on-year changes of several percentage points also raise questions about data
quality.
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3.1 Why Did ‘at Risk of Poverty’ (AROP) Rates not Fall Much?
It is useful to answer this question referring first to the period from the 1990s through
to the onset of the Great Recession and then, second, to the period after this. The first
period was marked by macro-economic growth, and so the usual expectation would
be that poverty rates would also fall. Why was this not the case?
Tony Atkinson gave three main reasons in his 2010 Macerata Lecture. The first
is that social inclusion received less priority than economic and employment growth
policies over this period. He points to the absence of concrete EU targets for poverty
and social inclusion which meant that ‘from the outset, social objectives appeared less
urgent’ (2010: 20). Tony also cites the influence of the High Level Group chaired by
Wim Kok which recommended in November 2004 that ‘overriding priority be given to
economic and employment growth policies’ (2010: 10–11) and Tony argues that this
recommendation was reflected in the 2005 Mid-Term Review of Lisbon Agenda. In
this review, the European Council concluded that it was essential to refocus priorities
on growth and employment and Tony refers to a ‘down-grading of the social agenda’
(2010: 11).
Tony’s second reason for lack of progress in poverty reduction is related to one of
his enduring themes. Tony points out that:
The Kok Report assumed that increased employment and growth would lead to
achievement of the social objectives. This assumption needs to be re-examined.
It is reasonable neither to simply assume that the objectives are complementary
nor to draw conclusions simply from the fact that poverty has not been reduced. It
is after all possible that employment policy worked in the direction of reducing
poverty and that, in the absence of the policy, poverty would have increased.
(2010: 11).
Characteristically, Tony elaborated on this issue with reference to a model of the
labour market, highlighting differences in productivity across workers and emphasis-
ing the role of the demand side of the market as well as the supply side. The ‘level of
employment depends on the willingness of employers to create jobs’ (2010: 12) and
this willingness depends on the costs associated with hiring and firing, and also recur-
rent costs including employer social insurance contributions. Raising employment
by reducing the reservation wages of workers may not contribute to social inclusion
objectives if higher employment is associated with, for example, a rise in the number
of low paid workers (he cites the case of Germany). Tony argues that:
Much of the thrust of labour market reform over the pre-crisis period has been
in this direction, by reducing the level and coverage of social protection and
tightening the conditions under which benefits are paid. (2010: 13).
Tony points out with reference to his labour market model that the adverse effects
on the poverty rate need not arise if alternative policies such as reducing the costs of
job creation are employed. In this case, the pursuit of the economic and employment
policy goal is indeed complementary to achievement of the social objective.
Bea Cantillon (2011) helpfully elaborates on these arguments making detailed ref-
erence to the impact of the shift in European policy orientation from ‘passive’ to
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‘activation’ strategies, drawing on EU-SILC data for supporting evidence. Her sum-
mary view is that:
First, rising employment has benefited workless households only marginally.
Consequently the number of job-rich households has increased while the num-
ber of jobless households has remained largely unchanged. Second, poverty
among unemployed and workless households increased in almost all Member
States. Third, new work-related spending—which tends to be less pro-poor—has
increased, while the generosity of traditional ‘passive’ income support declined.
… The conclusion must be that an adapted version of the old redistributive
agenda should again be focal in social policymaking, thereby prioritizing ade-
quate minimum income protection and the reinforcement of the redistributive
capacity of social programmes. (Cantillon 2011: 445. Emphasis in original.)
Tony Atkinson’s third explanation for the lack of marked decline in European
poverty rates is what ‘appears to have been the over-reliance of the Open Method
of Co-ordination on national policy initiatives’ (2010: 14). The point is that national
policy objectives reflect national priorities and that a lower national emphasis on the
achievement of social objectives leads to less progress on poverty reduction. This is
where Europe can play a role, Tony believed: ‘a significant reduction in European
poverty requires concerted European action’ (2010: 14).
In sum, there are clear diagnoses of the reasons why European poverty rates failed
to decline in the period prior to the onset of the Great Recession. What about the
period after 2009? Explaining a lack of decline is relatively straightforward in terms
of countries’ economic performance and the nature of the responses to the down-
turn, including the balance between different types of activation and traditional social
protection measures.
Virtually all European countries were hit by the global financial crisis of 2007–2009,
though to varying extents, and the accompanying recession brought with it higher
unemployment and financial stresses on households. There were variations in the
extent to which governments introduced explicit counter-cyclical policies (i.e. over
and above ‘automatic stabilizer’ mechanisms that kicked in). See Jenkins et al. (2013).
For example, impacts on households were less in countries such as Germany which
implemented short-time working measures which helped those in work (though not
already-jobless workers). Rather than experiencing economic recovery subsequently,
a number of European countries, especially Southern European ones, were then hit by
the sovereign debt crisis of 2011–2013. Particularly during this period, governments
placed increasing emphasis on austerity measures aimed at reducing public deficits
often with additional cuts in the real value of traditional social protection measures
and also in-kind services. On this, with discussion focusing on Southern Europe, see
for example Matsaganis and Leventi (2014).
Bea Cantillon’s and colleagues’ contemporary summary of the situation is that:
There are indeed structural constraints on the increase of the social floor and
difficult trade-offs involved in the reconciliation of work and poverty reduction.
Differences across countries are, however, enormous. This suggests that there
is ample maneuvering space for policymakers. There is also no evidence of a
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universal decrease in the generosity of social protection. Instead, throughout the
past decade, many European welfare states were “working harder.” However, it
appears that increasing financial work incentives was often prioritized, while in
many cases additional efforts were not used to raise minimum income packages
for jobless households. (Cantillon et al. 2019: 3.)
Put differently, and picking up the themes emphasized by Tony Atkinson and Bea
Cantillon regarding the earlier period, the general thrust of social policymaking (as
distinct from economic policy-making)—in particular the move towards activation
policies rather than traditional passive policies—continued or was intensified in the
later period and so there were similar effects (i.e. no decline) on AROP rates.
A potential fourth reason for the lack of decline in AROP rates, and perhaps also
the absence of marked rises in them as a result of the Great Recession, is the use of
the AROP indicator itself, with trends reflecting the way in which it is defined. Is the
EU’s headline poverty measure the appropriate one, and how does the picture look if
alternatives are used? I turn to these issues in the next section. Perhaps unsurprisingly,
we shall see that a shift to poverty indicators with a more absolute character is accom-
panied by a greater association between trends in the poverty indicator and in national
economic performance and also greater cross-national heterogeneity in poverty trends
(reflecting the heterogeneity in national economic performance cited above). Tony
Atkinson did not cite the definition of poverty indicator (AROP in particular) as an
explanation for disappointing poverty trends, though he was clearly very aware of the
issues and implications of different definitions—the extensive discussion in his 1998
Poverty in Europe book is but one illustration of this.
4 Some Conceptual andMeasurement Issues
The EU’s headline poverty indicator, the AROP rate, refers to household money income
and the low-income cut-off is characterized in terms of contemporary national living
standards (a fraction, 60%, of the median income). It is one particular interpretation
of the EU Council’s definition of poverty: ‘people are said to be living in poverty
if their income and resources are so inadequate as to preclude them from having a
standard of living considered acceptable in the society in which they live’ (Council
of the European Union 2004). Poverty today depends on national living standards in
the current year; and poverty in one European country is assessed without reference
to the living standards of another country.
The potential problems of using such a ‘relative’ poverty measure are well known
(Jenkins et al. 2013). During macro-economic downturns with effects throughout the
income distribution not only at the bottom, in particular that reduce median income, it is
possible for the headline poverty indicator to decrease. There may be fewer individuals
with incomes below the cut-off simply because the cut-off is lower. Similarly, during
macro-economic booms that lead to all-round increases in income, including at the
median, poverty rates may rise simply because the cut-off has increased. And similar
questions may be raised about the appropriateness of using the fully relative measure
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to compare poverty across countries with very different average living standards (see
for example Burkhauser 2009).
The question therefore arises of what happens if we use poverty indicators that
reflect changes in the real living standards of the poor over time to a greater extent, or
their differences across countries. That is, what if we use a more absolute approach to
measuring European poverty than the AROP rate, a fully relative indicator? In the rest
of this section, I first consider poverty trends for case of anchored poverty rates—rates
calculated setting the low-income cut-off as a fraction of a national median in some
specific year in the past. (Within each country, the poverty line is fixed in real terms
rather than changing over time, as with the AROP indicator.) I also look at how the
picture of European poverty changes if one moves to a common EU standard rather
than a national one.
Were Europe’s headline poverty indicators to be more absolute in nature, this would
bring Europe closer to the approach used in the USA—this has a single poverty line
for every state of the union, and this line is anchored in real income terms to living
standards around the turn of the 1960s. Observe too that the World Bank’s estimates
of global extreme poverty are also based on an absolute approach. The same poverty
line, currently $1.90 per day (in purchasing power parity adjusted ‘international dollar’
terms), is applied to all countries and regardless of the year(s) being considered.
(Following recommendations by Atkinson (2017), the Bank is also reporting estimates
based on a ‘societal poverty line’ which combines absolute and relative elements: see
World Bank 2018.) At the end of the section, I also look at European poverty patterns
using a multiple indicator (‘multiple deprivation’) approach, one with some ‘absolute’
features, and consider the extent to which results are correlated with the two income-
based poverty approaches.
4.1 Poverty Lines Anchored at National Values in 2005
Figures 1b and 2b show trends over time in poverty rates for the EU15 and NMS10
Member States, respectively, where the poverty line is now 60% of national median
income in 2005 (expressed in real income terms). The time series are shorter than in
Figs. 2 and 3: estimates are based on EU-SILC data only, and are missing for France,
Bulgaria, and Romania. With some exceptions, the general picture of poverty trends is
remarkably similar to the trends in the headline relative measure. The trend lines are
generally flattish as before, though there is some small decline in anchored poverty
rates just before the onset of the Great Recession, reflecting the patterns of economic
growth at that time. See for example the cases of Ireland, and many of the NMS.
What is surprising perhaps is that the stalling of economic growth in many EU
countries after 2007/8 did not lead to marked increases in anchored poverty rates in
most countries. This was because automatic stabilisers kicked in and (in some cases)
specific special safety net measures were deployed (Jenkins et al. 2013). See also the
earlier discussion.
But it is also important to note the exceptions. In countries most affected by the
financial crisis (and later sovereign debt crisis) and growing unemployment, anchored
poverty rates did increase much more dramatically—in Portugal, and especially Spain
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Note. Estimates for EU15 countries are shown in grey and for NMS10 countries in black. The 
poverty lines refer to those for a single adult household. Source: Eurostat Online Database (n.d.)
Fig. 3 Country-specific ‘60% of contemporary national median’ poverty lines expressed as a percentage of
Germany’s poverty line, 2016
where the rate more than doubled from just below 10% in around 2010 to over 20%
in 2014 and Greece where the rate more than doubled from just below 20% in around
2010 to over 40% in 2014.
One lesson is that trends in anchored poverty rates reflect national business cycles
and average income growth more closely than do trends in the headline AROP indi-
cator. However, if there is little economic growth, trends in the two poverty indicators
can be quite similar. Thus use of a relative measure (the AROP rate) rather than an
anchored poverty rate is not necessarily the reason why European income poverty
rates have not declined markedly.
A separate issue is whether EU poverty monitoring should be based on nationally-
defined standards (as now) or should move to some common standard, in particular
a line defined with reference to the EU as a whole. In terms of the EU Council’s
definition (see above), ‘the society in which they live’ is interpreted as Europe, not
the Member State. According to Tony Atkinson, an EU-wide line would represent ‘a
significant move towards viewing the European Union as a social entity’ (Atkinson
1998: 29). Even if individual citizens did not subscribe to that view, the use of an
EU-wide line takes into account that individuals’ sense of exclusion may be based on
a pan-European reference point rather than simply their national context. This makes
increasing sense in today’s world in which traditional and social media cross borders
to reach their audiences.
Because national poverty thresholds differ substantially in real income terms, mov-
ing to common EU-wide line makes a substantial difference to patterns of European
poverty. Figure 3 reveals the variation in national poverty lines, expressing each
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country’s ‘60% of median’ line for a single person in 2016 as a percentage of the
corresponding line for Germany. (The chart thus also shows relativities in median
income.) In concrete terms, the single-person poverty line for Germany was e12,765
per year,e20,291 in Luxembourg (around 170% of the German line), but onlye4500
in Greece (35%), and e1469 in Romania (only 11.5% of the German line). Put differ-
ently, in 2016, a single adult with an income of e10,000 per year would be counted as
poor in Germany using a 60% of national median poverty line, but non-poor in Italy,
Spain, Portugal, Greece, and all of the NMS10 countries. Moving to an EU-wide line,
for example 60% of the EU median in 2016, would imply a line lower than Germany’s
national line but substantially higher than those in Greece or Romania. And this would
of course have consequences for who is counted as poor.
Tony Atkinson (1998)—drawing on his presentation to a European Commission
conference a decade earlier—proposed that the reference point issue could be exam-
ined by using as a Member State’s poverty line a weighted average (a geometric mean)
of the national and EU poverty lines, where variations in a parameter θ allowed a range
of possibilities, from the case of fully national lines (θ  0) to a common EU line (θ
 1). That is,
Poverty line for country X  60%× (median income, X)(1−θ)
× (median income, EU)θ .
For values of θ lying strictly between 0 and 1, poverty trends in a country depend
not only on economic growth (changes in median income) in that country but also
economic growth in the EU as a whole.
Brandolini (2007) was the first to implement Atkinson’s idea using data for 21
European countries (for 2000), showing by how much moving towards a common EU
line would change the composition of the population counted as poor in Europe. See
Fig. 4 which summarizes his estimates. (National and EU-wide lines are each defined
as 60% of their respective medians.) As one moves from left to right (increasing θ ),
the poverty line gives greater weight to the EU median rather than the national median.
If fully national lines are used, then 14% of the individuals poor in the EU25 in 2000
are from Eastern Europe but, if a common EU-line is used, the fraction from Eastern
Europe increases to one-half. Over the same range in θ , there is little change in the
fraction from Southern Europe, but the fraction from Continental Europe falls by more
than one half, from 34 to 13%.
Goedemé et al. (2019) provide updated estimates, for 2008 and 2014, focusing on
the case in which the poverty line is 60% of the year-specific EU median (i.e. the
case θ  1) and provide more country-specific breakdowns. Figure 5 reproduces their
estimates. As in Brandolini’s chart, employing a fully EU-wide line means that the
countries contributing the most individuals to the EU poverty population are from
Eastern Europe—Poland and Romania in particular. Many countries contribute hardly
anyone.
The country-specific detail highlights the fact that the country composition of the
EU’s low-income population depends on both the population of each country and the
poverty rate for each country. Shifting to an EU-wide poverty line raises poverty rates
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Fig. 4 The regional composition of Europe’s low-income population, by value of θ , 2000
in relatively poor countries (mostly New Member States) but this has little effect on
the composition of the EU low-income population unless the country is relatively
large (compare Poland and Romania with Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania,
for example). At the same time, the shift to an EU-wide poverty line reduces poverty
rates in relatively rich countries, but a country continues to contribute relatively large
numbers of individuals to the EU total if it has a large population. Look at the cases
of Germany, UK, Spain, and Italy for instance.
Goedemé et al.’s (2019) estimates of the country-specific poverty rates in 2008
and 2014 based on the EU-wide poverty line are shown in Fig. 6. The proportion of
individuals in the EU27 with an income less than 60% of the EU median is around
20% in both years. Virtually all the countries with poverty rates less than the EU27
rate are the relatively rich countries of the original EU15; those with rates greater than
the EU27 rate are the relatively poor New Member States. Poverty rates using the EU-
wide standard fell sharply for Slovakia, Poland and Estonia but rose substantially for
Greece. The estimates shown in the figures also remind us that, although France is the
second most populous country in the EU, it contributes relatively few people to the EU
low-income population because its poverty rate according to the EU-wide measure is
relatively low. The Czech Republic, the third most populous country among the NMS,
also contributes few people to the EU low-income population for the same reason. By
contrast, Poland and Romania have large populations—they are two most populous
NMS (and ranked 6th and 7th in the EU as a whole)—and relatively high poverty rates.
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Note. The EU-wide poverty lines for 2008 and 2014 are 60 per cent of the year-specific EU-wide 
median income. The grey circles show 2008 estimates and the black diamonds show 2014 
estimates. Countries ranked by EU-SILC 2014 values. Source: Goedemé et al. (2019: Figure 4), 
redrawn by the author.
Fig. 5 The Member State composition of the EU-27’s low-income population (EU-wide threshold), EU-
SILC 2008–2014
Use of a common EU-level poverty standard raises uncomfortable challenges for
policy. Clearly, the more we move towards a common pan-EU poverty threshold, the
greater the prevalence of poverty that is recorded for the New Member States. This
brings back to the issue of the role of EU-level versus national-level policy initiatives
and the nature of the EU’s Open Method of Coordination. If the estimates arising from
embracing of a common EU-level poverty standard are to be taken seriously and to
guide policy, then the current reliance on national initiatives needs modification. EU-
level strategies and coordination are required but development of these requires all of
the Member States to sign up to them. If part of the solution to poverty problem is more
transfers from richer EU Member States to poorer ones, then getting that collective
agreement may be difficult. I return to this tension later on.
4.2 Poverty as Material Deprivation
First, however, I consider the role of a different measurement approach—the material
deprivation one—to consider how it changes the picture of EU poverty from the
income-based approach. The idea behind the material deprivation approach is, of
course, that poverty is not all (or not at all) about a lack of money—and that one should
look directly at people’s circumstances. The EU’s implementation follows closely the
measurement tradition pioneered by Peter Townsend (1979) in the UK. The approach
also introduces some ‘absolute’ components into the poverty measure, complementing
the ‘relative’ features of the AROP rate, in particular (more on this below).
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Note. The EU-wide poverty lines for 2008 and 2014 are 60 per cent of the year-specific EU-wide 
median income. The grey circles show 2008 estimates and the black diamonds show 2014 
estimates. Countries ranked by EU-SILC 2014 values. Source: Goedemé et al. (2019: Figure 2), 
redrawn by the author.
Fig. 6 Percentage poor, by Member State (EU-wide poverty line), EU-SILC 2008–2014
Table 2 Poverty as material
deprivation: 9 binary indicators
of inability to afford
Cannot afford
1. Pay rent or utility bills
2. Keep home adequately warm
3. Face unexpected expenses
4. Eat meat, fish, or protein equivalent every second day
5. Have a week’s holiday away from home
6. Car
7. Washing machine
8. Colour TV
9. Telephone
The EU currently summarizes material deprivation using 9 indicators. (The basket
of indicators is currently being modified: see Guio and Marlier 2017 for the back-
ground.) The indicators are listed in Table 2 and cover the inability to afford items
related to food, clothing and shelter (items 1–4), social participation (item 5), and
possession of durables (items 6–9). There are of course important issues about how to
summarise data on a dashboard of 9 binary indicators (to which I return below). For
the purposes of this paper, I focus on the EU’s measure of ‘severe material deprivation’
(SMD), which identifies individuals unable to afford four or more items out of the nine.
Figures 1c and 2c show country-specific estimates of trends in SMD rates for the
EU15 and NMS10. Among the EU15 the majority of the countries have relatively low
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SMD rates (around 5%) and rates that have changed little over the decade up to 2016
(apart from a rise in the UK and Ireland to 2012 followed by decline). Portugal, Italy,
and Greece stand out because their SMD rates are around 10% at the start of the period,
and increase markedly thereafter, especially in Greece (a rate of over 20% in 2016).
The NMS10 stand out too, because SMD rates are higher than in EU15 countries for
many of them. The rates are around 5% at the onset of the Great Recession for only
three countries (EE, CZ, SI), but reach around 45% in Bulgaria in 2010. The rate for
Bulgaria is around one-third in 2014–2016. Compared to the EU15, there is a more
distinct decline in SMD rates as the decade progressed.
More generally, it appears that trends over time in countries’ SMD rates tend to
be more similar to trends in their anchored poverty rates (Figs. 1b and 2b) than to
the trends in their AROP rates (Figs. 1a and 2a). Both SMD and anchored poverty
measures are reliant on components that are not updated over time—the deprivation
items and cut-off, and real income poverty line. The ranking of countries according to
SMD rate is not necessarily the same as the ranking by income poverty rate.
Figure 7 shows for 2016 the relationship at the country level between rates of SMD
and income poverty according to the headline AROP indicator, a relative measure.
The dashed lines show the EU27 averages for each measure. If there were a perfect
correlation between the two measures, i.e. if they provided the same information about
the situation of each Member State relative to others, each country data point would lie
on or close to a straight line fitted through the data points. Clearly this is not the case.
Although a fitted regression line would have a positive slope, there would be substantial
variation around the line with dispersion greater at above-average AROP rates. This
description applies regardless of whether the line is fit to the EU15 only, NMS10 only,
or all 25 countries. It appears that although there is much variation across the EU15
countries in AROP rates, there is relatively little variation in SMD rates aside from
outliers such as Portugal, Italy and especially Greece with relatively high SMD rates.
Instead there appears to be a closer relationship between the SMD rate and the
poverty rates based on the common EU-wide standard shown in Fig. 6. The set of
countries with the ten highest SMD rates in 2016 is almost identical to the set in 2014
with the ten highest poverty rates based on the common 60%-of-EU-median line. The
only difference is that Italy appears in the former list but not the latter, and vice versa
for Estonia.
In sum, the material deprivation approach paints a different picture of poverty across
Member States than the headline, most commonly-used indicator, the AROP measure.
(See also Fahey 2007 on this.) There are particular features of the material deprivation
measure contributing to this. In particular the SMD measure is based on a common
EU list of items which is applied to each Member State, and over the period under
consideration the list of items has not been updated—there are absolutist features
built into the indicator. By contrast, the headline relative measure (AROP) is based on
national medians and updated in line with the change in ‘average’ (median) national
living standards.
The apparently closer relationship between SMD rates and income poverty rates
based on an EU-wide standard does not imply that one approach has greater validity
than another. Assessments of validity are contingent on agreement about the fundamen-
tal concepts being measured. Experience suggests that it is hard to secure consensus
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Note. Estimates for EU15 countries are shown in grey and for NMS countries in black. Dashed 
lines show EU27 averages. Source: Eurostat Online Database (n.d.)
Fig. 7 Association between rates of SMD and AROP, 2016
about whether to prioritize relative or absolute income measures, and there are endur-
ing debates about the roles of income and material deprivation in summarizing poverty.
And there are of course many conceptual issues with the multiple deprivation approach
that I have not considered. These include questions such as the choice of indicators
and hence dimensions of deprivation, the use of binary versus categorical or continu-
ous measures, the choice of deprivation cut-offs in each dimension, and how to count
deprivations and whether and how to weight them. Many of these issues are considered
in the recent literature on multidimensional poverty. For pioneering papers, see e.g.
Atkinson (2003), Bourguignon and Chakravarty (2003) and Alkire and Foster (2011).
Alkire et al. (2014) is one of the first papers to apply the Alkire-Foster approach to
EU-SILC data.
The way forward is not to treat the choice of poverty indicator as if it were a binary
choice between black and white. Instead one should treat the multiple sources of infor-
mation as complements rather than substitutes, recognising that they each incorporate
different features (which individuals may attribute different levels of importance to),
and one should use all of them as a means to better to describe and understand changes
in household circumstances. As put by Tony Atkinson and co-authors, ‘[w]ithout com-
plementing the analysis of cross-sectional and longitudinal income-based indicators
with that of cross-sectional and longitudinal MD [material deprivation] variables, part
of the explanation behind these trends would have been missed’ (Atkinson et al. 2017:
42–43). Relatedly, a major theme of Tony’s final book (2019) is that ‘[t]there is not a
single monolithic concept. The meaning and interpretation of poverty is contested and
we need to consider different approaches to its measurement. … In order to under-
stand what lies behind these differing indicators, we have to ask the fundamental
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question as to the source of our concern about poverty and to recognise that people
may legitimately hold different views (2019: 211–212).
If one does emphasize the material deprivation approach, then the policy targeting
issues that I cited earlier in the context of the EU-wide measures arise again. The
countries with the highest SMD rates are mainly New Member States and Greece,
and there is the political issue of whether—or how—this finding might be translated
in a greater targeting of EU-level actions to alleviate the problems identified in these
countries.
There are also other indicators of the changes in living standards that could be
employed alongside those mentioned so far. For instance, the Eurostat Online Database
(n.d.) provides EU-SILC-based estimates of quantile group shares of total income by
year and country. The World Bank and OECD are now placing emphasis on concepts
such as ‘shared prosperity’ and ‘inclusive growth’ respectively. Shared prosperity is
commonly summarised in terms of (changes in) the share of total income held by
the poorest 40%. (For a discussion of interpretations and links with other measures,
see Ferreira et al. 2018.) Tony Atkinson supported the use of this indicator, but also
recommended that the real income levels of the poorest 40% should be examined. See
Atkinson et al. 2017, especially section 1.4.4) in the European context and Atkinson
(2017) in a global context. Also not considered here are the relative merits of measur-
ing of living standards in terms of consumption expenditure rather than income. See
Atkinson (1998, 2017, 2019) for reviews of the issues, and Serafino and Tonkin (2017)
for an EU-SILC application employing income, expenditure, and material deprivation
measures.
4.3 Multiple Measures and the EU2020 Social Inclusion Target
The issues of whether different measures provide similar information about Member
States and the circumstances of households within them has arisen again in the context
of the EU2020 Social Inclusion target. This is because the target refers not only to
income poverty and material deprivation but also to being in a very low-work intensity
household. More precisely, the ‘Fighting poverty and social exclusion’ target refers
to ‘a least 20 million fewer people in or at risk of poverty and social exclusion’.
Monitoring progress is based on comparisons of counts of persons who are: (1) at
risk of income poverty (measured using 60% of contemporary national median line),
or (2) severely materially deprived, or (3) living in households with very low work
intensity. On the one hand, individuals are only counted once in the total even if they
are present in more than one of the three sub-indicator counts. However, on the other
hand, a reduction in headline EU2020 count is possible via a reduction in any one of
the three dimensions.
The EU2020 approach is a ‘counting’ approach to the aggregation of the sub-
indicators in which the overall headline indicator requires an individual to be ‘deprived’
on all of the dimensions summarized by the sub-indicators. Figure 8 shows that using
different indicators leads to different results. It displays for EU Member States in 2016
a plot of country percentages of persons with at least one EU2020 problem against
the country percentages of persons with all three problems. (In the terminology of
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Note. Estimates for EU15 countries are shown in grey and for NMS countries in black. Dashed 
lines show EU27 averages. Source: Eurostat Online Database.
Fig. 8 Association between percentage with at least one EU2020 problem and percentage with all three
EU2020 problems, 2016
multidimensional poverty measurement, the former corresponds to a ‘union’ approach,
the latter to an ‘intersection’ approach: see Aaberge and Brandolini 2015.) Although
the correlation between percentages is positive, the relationship is weak. It is stronger
among the EU15 than the NMS10 but, even so, there are clear outliers such as Belgium
and Ireland with relatively high percentages of persons with all three problems. Among
the NMS there is substantial heterogeneity. Romania, Greece, and Bulgaria each have
similar percentages of individuals with at least problem (between 35 and 40%), but
Greece and Bulgaria have markedly higher percentages of individuals with all three
problems (between 5 and 6% compared with less than 3%).
There are further issues concerning the target which deserve attention. Is the use of
three indicators official recognition that each indicator picks up different information
(the issue raised in the previous paragraphs)? Or, more cynically, is the target’s speci-
fication simply a politically expedient way of avoiding making a decision about what
‘poverty’ really is?
5 The Future Direction of EU-Level Anti-Poverty Actions
The discussion so far has argued that, substantial progress has been made over the
last two to three decades in EU-level initiatives in statistical monitoring of poverty
and social exclusion and in developing an anti-poverty agenda. But at the same time
the prevalence of poverty remains stubbornly high (and according to a range of mea-
surement approaches). The progress cited has always involved a mixture of reliance
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Fig. 9 Progress towards the EU social inclusion target, 2005–2015
on EU-level and national-level initiatives relating to, for example, the way in which
the monitoring indicators are defined. And at the heart of the EU’s current approach
is the combination of the EU-level Open Method of Coordination regarding higher
level strategizing, but implementation is centred around national action plans and their
policies. In this final section, I reflect on how monitoring might develop (nature of
indicators, data), whether the shape of the anti-poverty strategy should change, and
whether we should be pessimistic or optimistic about progress. Once again I draw
heavily on the work of Tony Atkinson.
Figure 9, summarizing progress towards meeting the EU2020 target, and taken
from Atkinson et al. (2017), is the starting point. Year 2008 provides the baseline
data for assessing progress towards the ‘20 million fewer’ target for 2020. Reading
upwards from the bottom, the lines show the evolution of the numbers of individuals in
quasi-jobless household rate (QJ), in severe material deprivation (SMD) and at risk of
poverty (AROP, as described earlier). The number at risk of poverty or social exclusion
(AROPE) is the combination of the information about AJ, SMD and AROP using the
rules for calculating the EU2020 indicator cited in the previous section. The EU2020
target would be achieved if the number of persons AROPE in 2008, 115.908 million,
fell to 95.908 million or fewer by 2020: look at the line with the arrowhead.
The headline result is the lack of progress towards meeting the EU2020 target so
far. As of 2016, the number of persons AROPE was larger (117.604 million) rather
than smaller than the baseline number for 2008. The chart also shows that the only
sub-indicator of the three that is heading in the right direction is the SMD one.
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5.1 Grounds for Pessimism?
A pessimistic reaction about the possibility of progress towards the EU2020 target
seems justified on the basis of this evidence, especially when one takes into account
the changes in the socio-economic context that may hinder EU-level initiatives and
many national ones. I am referring not only to the nature of macroeconomic environ-
ment (discussed earlier) though clearly it is relevant that many policy-makers argue
that addressing social problems should take lower priority to economic ones in this
Austerity Era. It is also that the ‘EU’ itself has changed and continues to evolve sub-
stantially as a result of enlargement and migration, both internally and from outside
the EU. There are distinct differences in economic performance across Member States.
With the nationalistic surge in many Member States, including the Brexit referendum
vote in the UK, it would seem to be hard to argue that there is sufficient cross-national
solidarity for more concerted supra-national EU-level initiatives in social policy.
Put differently, the prospect of introducing new anti-poverty policies such as an EU-
wide basic income for children as proposed by Tony Atkinson in his 2010 Macerata
Lecture seems infeasible in the current climate and so not worth arguing for.
5.2 Or Grounds for Optimism?
Tony Atkinson’s reaction was at odds with the pessimistic view, and he continued to
make suggestions about what he thought would be fruitful progress on anti-poverty
policy measures. In the European context, he made several proposals together with
co-authors Guio and Marlier (2017). They recommend continuing to improve the
current monitoring infrastructure and the Open Method of Coordination, making a
principled case for effective policies and policy analysis. They write about increasing
(not decreasing) the EU’s ambition—to look beyond 2020 for framing EU targets
and to draw on the Sustainable Development Goals framework (which refer to 2030
targets). The SDGs are now global in scope (about rich countries as well as poor
ones, unlike the Millennium Development Goals) and incorporate national poverty
objectives in their targets. This leads Tony and colleagues to suggest, inter alia, that
the EU should also add indicators of ‘extreme poverty’ and of ‘real income growth of
poorest 40%’ to existing EU social indicators. They stress that the five EU2020 targets
and policies directed at them should not be looked at in isolation; economic and social
goals and measures need to be looked at together.
Tony and colleagues also give reasons for their proposed strategy:
Faced with such failure [to make good progress towards the EU2020 tar-
gets], Europe’s leaders may simply decide to throw in the towel, and write off
2010–2020 as a ‘lost decade’. The Europe 2020 objective of a reduction of a
sixth may simply be pushed 10 years into the future. Such an outcome would be
extremely disappointing to those concerned with the social dimension of Europe,
and devastating for the millions of Europe’s citizens living at risk of poverty or
social exclusion. We believe that the SDGs, with their greater ambition, should
be the basis for setting Europe’s commitment for 2030. Halving poverty by 2030
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should not be beyond the resources of a rich continent. (Atkinson et al. 2017:
46−47).
Tony’s reactions to the progress relative to the EU2020 benchmarks are further
evidence of his enduring themes and traits that I referred to in the Introduction. There
is persistence in his views about the direction of social security policy as well. Tony
strongly believed in the social insurance model, highlighting problems that arise with a
reliance on means-testing, but he was also very much open to supplementation through
forms of basic income schemes. His 2010 Macerata Lecture proposal for an EU-wide
basic income for children was predated by consideration of a ‘participation income’ (a
basic income conditional on making an appropriate social contribution, which could
including caring as well as paid work) in his 1998 Poverty in Europe book. He returned
to the same idea in Inequality. What Can be Done? (2015) addressing financing in
great detail in order to demonstrate that his proposals were feasible.
When I was first thinking about future directions in EU poverty monitoring and
policy, I was a pessimist of the kind I characterized earlier. But I have changed my mind
after re-reading Tony Atkinson’s work—something that has happened a lot during my
career! I now think that to be pessimistic is to be defeatist; to make progress happen,
you have to believe, optimistically, that progress is possible—just as Tony did. As
ever, he puts the case eloquently and persuasively. In the final section of his 2015
book, Tony emphasised that social progress had been made over the longer term. He
acknowledged contemporary problems, but argued that further progress was possible
and something we should explicitly aim for:
I have written this book in a positive spirit. I have stressed the importance of
looking back in time, but I do not believe that we have returned to a world like
that when Queen Victoria was alive. … It is true that since 1980 we have seen an
“Inequality Turn” and that the twenty-first century brings challenges in terms of
ageing of the population and climate change. But the solutions to these problems
lie within our own hands. If we are willing to use today’s greater wealth to address
these challenges, there are indeed grounds for optimism. (Atkinson 2015: 308).
Tony will continue to inspire us and influence our work on European poverty and
anti-poverty policy—and all the other topics he worked on. This paper has shown
that further work is required on the advantages and disadvantages of different poverty
indicators, taking into account not only conceptual issues but also those of empirical
implementation related to data availability and quality, as well as on issues of the
political economy of anti-poverty policy in an era that continues to be dogged in many
countries by austerity and greater questioning of the roles of EU-level versus national
institutions and initiatives.
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